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The politicisation of European governance has become an important subject in debates about 
the institutional design, day-to-day decision-making and democratic legitimacy of the 
European Union (EU). This Special Issue takes stock of this development of politicisation 
research, including the theoretical development as well as the rapidly expanding body of 
empirical evidence. It synergises the various perspectives on politicisation of European 
governance, building on a common understanding of politicisation as a three-dimensional 
process involving increasing salience, polarisation of opinion and the expansion of actors 
and audiences involved in EU issues. The introduction outlines the central theoretical and 
conceptual questions concerning the politicisation of European governance and provides a 
guiding framework for the contributions to this Special Issue. The contributions document 
that a differentiated Europe leads to differentiated politicisation across times, countries and 
settings. The differentiated patterns, particularly across countries, present profound 
challenges to the future trajectory of European integration and its democratic legitimacy.  
 
 
Key words: European Integration, European Union, Governance, Politicisation 
  
4 
The 2017 referendum on United Kingdom (UK) membership of the European Union (EU) and 
its central role in the 2015 UK general elections (Startin 2015) testifies to five fundamental 
characteristics of European integration and politics within its member states: First, questions 
related to European governance generate fundamental controversy among EU citizens, in 
media debates and in party political competition (Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Risse 2015). 
Second, these questions concern both constitutional issues, such as whether a particular 
country wants to be a member of the EU and what powers EU institutions should have, and 
more specific policy questions, like the right to free movement within the Schengen area. 
Third, the degree and nature of this controversy vary across time, space and settings as other 
member states do not feature such a referendum, and it is the first referendum on the EU 
within the UK since 1975 (Hobolt 2009; Hutter and Grande 2014). Many argue that the 
political climate in which European integration unfolds since the early 1990s can no longer be 
characterised as a ‘permissive consensus’ in which citizens allow elites to shape the nature, 
direction and speed of integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Risse 2015). Others challenge 
whether there really is a fundamental break with the period before the 1990s (Hutter and 
Grande 2014; Schrag Sternberg 2013). Fourth, while referenda obviously function as a 
catalyst for paramount and manifest controversy, deeper causes account for the more enduring 
and widespread existence of this controversy (De Wilde and Zürn 2012; Statham and Trenz 
2015). Fifth, the prospect of such tests of public legitimacy of the EU drives a renegotiation of 
the terms of European integration and the outcome of these tests carry profound consequences 
for the EU (Rauh 2012; Schimmelfennig et al. 2015). 
 This special issue sets out to investigate the process of ‘politicisation’ of European 
governance (De Wilde 2011; De Wilde and Zürn 2012; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Statham and 
Trenz 2013). Different understandings exist of what exactly politicisation entails, somewhat 
dependent on the disciplinary background of scholarship, dominated by comparative politics, 
political sociology, international relations, public administration and communication science. 
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Furthermore, what is understood as politicisation depends on the empirical focus of study. An 
emphasis on party politics, public opinion or mass media coverage, and the use of the 
respective data sources leads to slightly different understandings of politicisation (for an 
overview, see De Wilde 2011). Still, a convergence in recent years is noticeable. Most 
students of politicisation refer to a component of importance (societal actors consider EU 
issues more important for their interests or values), a behavioural component (societal actors 
spend more resources on contesting or influencing EU issues), a preference component 
(opinions diverge about what the EU should be and do) and a socialisation component (more 
societal actors become attentive and/or engaged in EU affairs). While these components show 
up in many studies of politicisation, the way they are labelled, conceptualised and aggregated 
varies depending on the focus of the study at hand. 
 We condense these components into a three-dimensional concept to facilitate the 
analysis of politicisation in a wide variety of settings. We posit that politicisation can be 
empirically observed in (a) the growing salience of European governance, involving (b) a 
polarisation of opinion, and (c) an expansion of actors and audiences engaged in monitoring 
EU affairs (cf. De Wilde 2011; De Wilde and Zürn 2012; Green-Pedersen 2012; Hutter and 
Grande 2014; Statham and Trenz 2013; Zürn et al. 2012). The latter dimension especially 
directs most studies of politicisation to the public sphere as the infrastructure through which 
more actors and audiences become involved in European governance. In fact, whereas 
European integration was invariably contested among executive politicians and bureaucrats, 
the changes brought about by politicisation are unthinkable without the broader resonance of 
EU issues in the public sphere. 
 The contributions to this volume start out from this three-dimensional understanding 
of politicisation. This allows us to address three specific sets of questions in a detailed 
fashion. First, we ask a descriptive question: Is there just one pattern of politicisation of which 
there can be ‘more’ or ‘less’, ‘increasing’ or ‘decreasing’, or are we rather confronted with 
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differentiated politicisation? More specifically, we ask how and to what extent does the 
politicisation of European governance manifest itself empirically? That is, how salient and 
polarised is European governance? How many and which individual and collective actors are 
involved in EU affairs? And, in which settings can we locate politicisation? 
 Second, we ask how the observed variance of different patterns of politicisation can be 
explained. Is there a single underlying cause of politicisation, which translates into different 
patterns due to varying contextual conditions? Or do different settings, times and locations 
feature a plurality of causes? The hypothesis that the increasing authority of the EU fuels 
politicisation would predict the first. An explanatory focus on elite cueing, identity or 
contestation driven by economic interests points to variations in patterns of politicisation.  
 Finally, we turn to the still largely unexplored normative and empirical consequences 
of politicisation. Do different patterns of politicisation empower some actors over others? Do 
they affect the course of the integration process towards more or less sovereignty transfer 
and/or membership enlargement (see Schimmelfennig et al. 2015 for a recent contribution to 
this research agenda)? Does politicisation enhance the democratic quality of European 
governance or does it inhibit the efficiency of supranational decision-making? 
Dimensions of Variation in Politicisation 
European integration was long perceived to be the prerogative of state executives, bureaucrats 
and lawyers. The permissive consensus narrative argued that major initial decisions that set 
the process of integration into motion were taken in closed circles, outside the spotlight of 
public scrutiny. The vast majority of citizens did not care about European integration, and to 
the limited extent that they did, they provided latent support (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). 
In fact, the historical trajectory of European integration is more complex. A first episode of 
politicisation could already be observed in 1954 during the failed ratification of the European 
Defence Community in the French parliament. Long-term analyses by Grande and Hutter 
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(2016), Hoeglinger (2016) and Schmidtke (2016) demonstrate that the politicisation of 
European governance is not an entirely new feature of the post-Maastricht period. Rather, it 
appears to follow more cyclical trajectories, which have intensified considerably over the past 
decades. 
 These cycles can also be traced in the scholarly literature explaining the logics of 
European integration. Early thinkers, such as Haas (2004) and Schmitter (1969) considered 
politicisation an important force. Yet, many of their neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist 
successors (Hoffmann 1964; Milward 2000; Moravcsik 1998) did not ascribe a major 
influence to societal actors, like political parties, mass media or citizens. More recently, 
Schmitter’s (1969: 166) expectation that one day in the future, the ‘controversality of joint 
decision making’ would rise and in turn lead to ‘a widening of the audience or clientèle 
interested and active in integration’ (italics in original), enjoys a growing scholarly popularity. 
The concept and its three core dimensions of salience, polarisation and expansion of actors 
and audiences have regained attention the latest after the rejection of the constitutional treaty 
in France and the Netherlands in 2005. Reviewing the early literature, De Wilde (2011: 560) 
highlights the public sphere as the primary locus of politicisation and defines politicisation as 
‘an increase in polarisation of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are 
publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation within the EU’. This 
understanding implies that a multitude of actors engages with issues of European governance 
via direct participation, public debate or protest. These manifestations of actor engagement 
are time and place specific. They result in different patterns of politicisation with respect to 
the relative strength of salience and polarisation in various settings, the specific constellation 
of actors and audiences, the behavioural manifestations of politicisation and its substantive 
content (see also De Wilde and Zürn 2012; Hurrelmann et al. 2013). 
 Yet, contrary to Schmitter’s expectation that the higher salience of European 
integration would lead to more support, recent politicisation research has shown that 
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increasing salience does not result in invariable support for European governance (Hobolt and 
Tilley 2014). Rising levels of Euroscepticism, as manifested in the electoral success of 
populist right-wing parties, and mounting public criticism uttered by a growing set of actors 
indicate that politicisation is driven primarily by those critical of the integration process rather 
than by those who are supportive. 
 To address these controversial expectations and empirical observations, the 
contributions to this volume build on the multidimensional concept of politicisation. We 
understand salience as the importance attributed to the EU and European integration. It may 
be indicated by the amount of newspaper articles reporting on European governance (e.g. 
Grande and Hutter 2016; Hoeglinger 2016; Leupold 2016; Schmidtke 2016), how ‘aware’ 
citizens are of the existence of the EU, its institutions and policies and how worried they are 
about EU politics, (Baglioni and Hurrelmann 2016), by the amount of public statements party 
representatives dedicate to EU issues in national election campaigns (Hoeglinger 2016) or by 
the number of parliamentary questions devoted to EU issues (Wonka 2016). 
 Polarisation signifies an occupation of more extreme positions – either in favour of or 
against different aspects of EU governance – and/or a depletion of neutral, ambivalent or 
indifferent attitudes. The ultimate polarised scenario would feature diametrically opposed 
coalitions of societal groups at extreme positions with neutral voices having been crowded 
out. In politicisation research, polarisation has been often operationalised as polarisation of a 
country’s party system (Kriesi et al. 2012: 113; Kriesi et al. 2008: 364). More recently, the 
concept is also increasingly used as an indicator for the positions of other agents of 
politicisation and in measuring disagreement about European governance in public opinion 
surveys (Van Ingelgom 2014). 
 Finally, actor and audience expansion captures the growing number of citizens and 
collective actors who dedicate resources in the form of time and money to follow and engage 
with EU governance. In the mass media, this largely takes the shape of actor expansion of 
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predominantly elite and collective actors (Hutter and Grande 2014) since those who engage 
with EU governance must actively communicate to make it to the news. However, online and 
social media are increasingly dominated by direct citizens’ voice (De Wilde et al. 2014). 
Among citizens, audience expansion may take more passive forms. Here, increasing public 
resonance in the form of the amount of citizens regularly following EU events and the 
respective news signifies politicisation. One way in which audience expansion may manifest 
is in the traveling of debate from one setting to the next; for instance from parliamentary 
plenaries to newspaper coverage to social media. 
 In our understanding, all three elements listed above need to be present for 
politicisation. Thus, the contributions to this special issue investigate the salience, polarisation 
and expansion of actors and audiences surrounding EU governance over time, across space 
and in different settings, even if differences remain about empirical indicators and the relative 
importance of these dimensions. 
Settings 
Patterns of politicisation as well as developments over time are crucially dependent on the 
settings, in which politicisation takes place (De Wilde 2014: 6; Kriesi et al. 2012). Settings 
constitute frameworks or environments, in which politicisation becomes publicly manifest. 
We distinguish between three central political settings as particularly important to 
politicisation: parliaments (mostly mass mediated), public spheres and public opinion. The 
main focus of this volume is on domestic arenas. While a growing literature argues that a 
stronger politicisation of the European Parliament (EP) and the respective elections might 
help to alleviate the EU’s alleged democratic deficit (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008; Mair 
2007; Statham and Trenz 2015), transnational politicisation remains relatively week. Even 
Euro crisis protest events have remained largely confined to national borders (Pianta 2013: 
157) and EP elections are still of secondary importance to voters (Clark and Rohrschneider 
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2009; Hobolt and Spoon 2012). In line with these findings, the politicisation of European 
governance proceeds mainly in nationally segmented publics instead of a transnationally 
integrated settings (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014b; Risse 2010; but see Risse 2015 for a 
more optimistic perspective on future developments). The main reasons for this segmentation 
seem to be structural barriers, such as nationally structured media systems (Wessler et al. 
2008). 
 National parliaments are often considered to be at the core of the European polity, 
understood as a system of institutions linked through relationships of delegation and 
accountability and based on the principles of representative democracy (Lord and Pollak 
2010). Recent studies of politicisation in parliamentary debates show that European 
governance is indeed becoming more salient and controversial among parliamentarians (Closa 
and Maatsch 2014; Rauh 2015; Wendler 2014). In many national parliaments, the era of the 
permissive consensus – if it ever fully existed – is over and they aim to play a more crucial 
role in European politics not only since the Euro crisis. Although parliaments’ engagement 
with European governance remains selective and is conditioned by institutional factors, issue 
salience and party politics, there seems to be a more general politicisation trend (Auel and 
Christiansen 2015). Wonka (2016) illustrates this development for the German Bundestag 
during the Euro crisis. 
 With its key interlinking function between politicians and citizens, the (mass 
mediated) public sphere connects political decision-making processes to preference 
formation, articulation and aggregation among the citizenry (Koopmans and Statham 2010: 
54). Populated by journalists, party representatives, interest groups and an increasing number 
of non-professionals interested in European governance, this setting constitutes a transmission 
belt between European institutions and citizens (Castells 2008: 78; Habermas 1996: 360; 
Pfetsch et al. 2010). Respective research shows that a broad variety of actors voices positions 
on European governance in the mass media. This setting is thus often considered to play a 
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crucial role in the politicisation process (Kleinen-von Königslöw 2012; Koopmans and 
Statham 2010; Kriesi et al. 2012; Risse 2010; Statham and Trenz 2013, 2015). The majority 
of the contributions to this volume draw on mass media data to study politicisation, albeit for 
different reasons: While some consider mass media as the primary setting of democratic 
politics due to its communicative and connecting functions (De Wilde and Lord 2016; 
Leupold 2016), others consider it a data source for the analysis of politicisation more 
generally (Grande and Hutter 2016; Hoeglinger 2016; Schmidtke 2016). 
 The contributions to this special issue indicate considerable variance of the 
politicisation patterns of European governance in media debates: Schmidtke provides 
evidence in support of a growing politicisation of European Governance in mass media over 
time. The study by Grande and Hutter shows that country-specific levels of politicisation are 
largely shaped by political events related to authority transfer to the EU, such as the question 
of EU membership or whether a referendum is held. Yet, Hoeglinger warns against an 
overestimation of the level of politicisation. His analysis demonstrates that national election 
campaigns are still dominated by other issues than European governance (see also Kriesi et al. 
2012). While media debates about European governance may be generally on the rise, 
attention strongly fluctuates in cycles, differs across countries and often lags behind other 
issues. 
 These findings are underlined with a view to the politicisation of European governance 
among European citizens in Baglioni and Hurrelmann’s (2016) study of laypeople – a 
perspective largely understudied in the current literature (but see Stoeckel 2013; Van 
Ingelgom 2014). While parliamentarians and actors present in mass media seem to have 
picked up European governance as a controversial issue, citizens do not appear to follow this 
development swiftly. Drawing on survey and protest data as well as focus group interviews, 
the authors demonstrate that the mobilisation of individual citizens to engage with European 
governance is still considerably lower than the politicisation literature suggests for 
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parliaments and mass media. Overall, the contributions show that there is no universal pattern 
and no simple linear trend of politicisation. Rather, we are confronted with a differentiated 
politicisation of European governance, in which patterns vary substantially across settings and 
time. 
Objects 
In a well-cited article, Mair (2007) differentiates between different forms of opposition to the 
EU, which in turn have varying implications for the EU’s empirical legitimacy (for related 
arguments about global governance, see Zürn and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2013). While opposition to 
individual policies is constitutive of the democratic process (Norris 1999), opposition to the 
polity questions the legitimacy of a political system (Easton 1965). Mair’s main contention is 
that the European polity hardly allows for opposition to policies due to the weak 
accountability of key decision-makers in the European Commission and the European 
Council, which are relatively shielded from public scrutiny. Lacking the opportunity to ‘throw 
the rascals out,’ critical parliamentarians, interest groups and citizens redirect their discontent 
toward the polity itself. Mair’s argument implies that the lack of electoral accountability 
directly fuels a specific pattern of politicisation, which denounces the European polity as the 
object of politicisation. 
 The current literature on the politicisation of European governance, however, rarely 
distinguishes between different objects of politicisation and can thus only provide limited 
insights into the consequences of politicisation. Only if we know whether conflict is organised 
around the legitimacy of the Union itself or around day-to-day EU decision-making, does it 
become possible to gauge the effects of politicisation. The contributions to this volume reveal 
that politicisation objects vary substantially across settings: Baglioni and Hurrelmann (2016) 
and Hoeglinger (2016) show that citizens as well as parties in electoral campaigns focus 
mainly on the polity as politicisation object. For these settings, Mair might be right because 
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politicisation appears to be mainly organised in terms of principled opposition to or support 
for the EU as a whole. 
 Yet, parliamentary debates do not solely address the legitimacy of the European polity. 
Wonka (2016) shows that the European measures to tackle the financial crisis became a major 
object of politicisation in the German parliament. Similarly, Wendler’s (2014: 563) 
comparative analysis of parliamentary debates demonstrates that constitutive issues of EU 
Treaty reform are quickly linked to redistributive concerns. Admittedly, the empirical 
distinction between policy and polity as objects of politicisation is sometimes hard to make, 
either because agents of politicisation underspecify what they support or oppose, or because 
the EU has constitutionalised certain policies. The Economic and Monetary Union is a case in 
point, in which macroeconomic policies have been constitutionalised in the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Grande’s and Hutter’s (2016) analysis of different types of polity politicisation 
shows that matters are even more complicated. The authors demonstrate that public debates 
about Treaty revision and the respective empowerment of EU institutions, one’s home 
country’s membership and the accession of other countries vary strongly. They find that the 
issue of membership generates much more politicisation then Treaty revision or accession. 
 Unpacking EU policies Leupold (2016) and Schmidtke (2016) analyse issue-specific 
politicisation processes. They show that mass media do not only feature controversy over the 
European polity but that, under specific conditions, EU day-to-day policy-making and policies 
also become objects of politicisation. It thus seems that concerns about the polity are 
particularly dominant among citizens, whereas both parliamentary debate and mass media 
coverage feature a broader array of politicisation objects. 
 In sum, the empirical analyses presented in this volume demonstrate that the 
politicisation of European governance is more differentiated than the current literature 
expects. Neither is politicisation equal to the rising prominence of Euroscepticism or 
unconditional support, nor are patterns of politicisation stable across settings. Politicisation 
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among citizens appears to be much weaker than in mass media and parliaments, and to focus 
more on the EU polity than on day-to-day policy-making. 
Drivers of Politicisation and Conditions of Variance 
Following Schmitter’s (1969) initial theorising, De Wilde and Zürn (2012) argue that the 
politicisation of European governance is here to stay as long as its driving force – the 
increasing authority of the EU itself – remains in place. This authority transfer hypothesis is 
based on two assumptions: First, citizens and collective political actors are expected to care 
about who decides about their living conditions. Second, they are assumed to be capable of 
identifying the political institutions that make important decisions for them. Accordingly, they 
direct their demands and objections to these institutions. The contributions to this volume 
demonstrate that the authority transfer hypothesis needs modification: Patterns of authority 
transfer and politicisation only match to a limited extend. EU authority has steadily increased 
over time and has become particularly strong in the core member states that are full members 
of the Eurozone, Schengen, the Area of Freedom and Justice and EU foreign policy (Genschel 
and Jachtenfuchs 2014a; Leuffen et al. 2013). Yet, we do not observe a steady increase of 
politicisation over time and politicisation levels vary by country and integration step. At the 
same time, we document that the authority of the EU is one of the dominant objects of 
politicisation. Of utmost concern is the question of membership: shall we be a member of the 
EU and/or the Eurozone mobilises people much more than treaty revisions or the accession of 
other countries (Grande and Hutter 2016). Yet, we also demonstrate that the day-to-day 
exercise of formal authority spurs politicisation (Leupold 2016; Schmidtke 2016; Wonka 
2016). 
 Overall, these results indicate that the explanatory power of intermediating variables 
should not be underestimated. Authority transfer does not automatically translate into uniform 
patterns of politicisation in all EU member states. To understand the differentiated patterns of 
15 
politicisation, we need to consider the interactive relationship between authority transfer and 
country-specific relationships with the EU, different political and economic systems and 
different opportunities in the form of elections and referenda. 
 The strategic competition hypothesis argues that politicisation is largely driven by 
strategically competing party officials (Sitter 2008; Taggart 1998). Our contributions, 
however, find only limited support for this argument. Although empirical studies show that 
political parties are indeed central actors in shaping politicisation patterns and that public 
opinion is moulded through cuing by elites in top-down direction (Hooghe and Marks 2009; 
Steenbergen et al. 2007), parties operate less strategically than expected. Rather, Hoeglinger’s 
(2016) contribution highlights that political parties competing for office tend to shy away 
from strong EU politicisation as the complex nature of European integration does not allow 
for simple position-taking irrespective of party ideology. 
 In support of the cleavage transformation hypothesis (Hooghe et al. 2004; Kriesi et al. 
2012; Kriesi et al. 2008; Marks and Wilson 2000), we show in different contexts that party 
competition is constrained by ideology (Hoeglinger 2016; Schmidtke 2016; Wonka 2016). 
These ideational preferences of constituencies are considered to be shaped by macro 
processes like globalisation and migration (Kriesi et al. 2012; Kriesi et al. 2008), dominant 
policies enacted by the EU, i.e. neoliberal market-making up until the early 1990s and 
subsequent market regulation (Hooghe et al. 2004). 
 Additionally, the institutional misfit hypothesis (cf. Börzel and Risse 2000) argues that 
the greater the discrepancy between the national economic and political system and the EU 
system, the higher the potential for politicisation (Brinegar et al. 2004). Leupold (2016) 
presents new evidence supporting this hypothesis, albeit qualifying the mechanism how 
politicisation plays out under the condition of institutional misfit in the public sphere. Given 
that the EU affects a range of different national policies, countries suffering from high 
institutional misfit, which consequently strive to alter European rules, are more likely to use 
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inside-lobbying strategies that are more sensitive diplomatically. As a result, the level of 
publicly visible EU politicisation is higher in countries with a good institutional fit, which 
tend to defend the status quo. 
 Finally, the proxy hypothesis states that EU citizens use other criteria of assessment to 
form their opinions about the EU. Kritzinger (2003: 321) analyses public support for 
European integration in relation to individuals’ assessment of national political and economic 
performance. She finds that ‘[c]itizens use domestic realities as proxies for their attitudes 
towards the EU’ (Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010). In some 
countries, a negative assessment of national politics is associated with a positive attitude 
towards European integration because citizens see the EU as a lifebuoy to protect them from 
the incompetence of national politicians (Munoz et al. 2011). In Germany and Italy, for 
example, citizens who dislike national politics because of corruption or historical militarism 
have a positive attitude towards European integration. In contrast, French and British citizens 
become more positive towards European integration as their assessment of national economic 
performance improves (Kritzinger 2003). To them, the EU is an extension of the nation-state, 
not an alternative. Baglioni and Hurrelmann (2016) address the question of citizens’ 
attribution of responsibility in the Euro crisis. Their findings imply that the EU is not 
considered responsible for the crisis. Rather, citizens still address their demands to the 
national level. Overall, findings on the proxy hypothesis so far rebut a simple blame-shifting 
mechanism from the national level to the EU (Hobolt and Tilley 2014; Nullmeier et al. 2014: 
197-218). 
 The contributions to the special issue show that differentiated politicisation results 
from a complex interaction of different types of authority transfer and a set of context 
conditions. The relationship between authority transfer and politicisation is not a static one 
between cause and effect. Rather, patterns of politicisation are shaped substantially by 
country-specific institutional, economic and cultural conditions. These context-specific 
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factors often carry greater explanatory powers than the underlying fundamental authority 
transfer. 
Consequences 
The proposition that European governance has become politicised is accepted widely in the 
recent literature and supported by an increasing wealth of empirical evidence (but see 
Hoeglinger 2016 for a sceptical perspective). In contrast, the academic debate about the 
consequences of politicisation remains shaped by theory-driven controversies and dependent 
on assumptions about the nature of the EU. On the one hand, we find the neofunctionalist 
expectation that politicisation leads to more authority transfer (Schmitter 1969). On the other 
hand, we find the postfunctionalist argument that politicisation constitutes a brake on 
integration. Because citizens are less supportive of integration than elites politicisation 
reduces the possibilities for state executives to reach compromises in the EU framework 
(Hooghe and Marks 2009). Recent studies on the Euro crisis take a third perspective, arguing 
that politicisation takes the critical connotation expected by postfunctionalists, but has little 
constraining effect on the integration process (Schimmelfennig 2014). 
 The normative debate about the effects of politicisation on democratic legitimacy 
centres on the ontological nature of the EU. Those who see the EU as an instrument in the 
hands of sovereign nation-states – a typical international organisation – argue the EU does not 
need to be democratic, as democratic legitimacy is safeguarded at the national level 
(Moravcsik 2006). Politicisation would be detrimental from this perspective, because it could 
jeopardise Pareto-optimal regulatory solutions (Majone 1998). 
 By contrast, those arguing that the EU is a polity in the making, tend to argue that 
standards of democratic legitimacy should apply, and identify a democratic deficit (Eriksen 
2009; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007; Lord 1998; Risse 2010). Habermasians and 
competitive elitists share an understanding of politicisation as beneficial to EU democracy, 
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albeit for different reasons. The Habermasians understand more public debate as a 
precondition for democratic collective will-formation and for holding those in power to 
account (Rauh and Zürn 2014; Risse 2015; Statham and Trenz 2015). Elitists rather focus on 
the articulation of conflict, and its pressure on partisan elites to take a stance on Europe to 
offer voters a meaningful choice during elections (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Van der Eijk and 
Franklin 2004). Finally, consociationalists warn about the centrifugal effects of conflict in 
heterogeneous polities like the EU whose stability relies on the capacity of elites to make 
compromises behind closed doors (Bartolini 2006; Papadopoulos and Magnette 2010). As 
politicisation makes such compromises more difficult, if not impossible, it could ultimately 
tear the Union apart. 
 Linked to this normative debate is the question of how European integration affects 
democracy at the national level. Pessimists argue that European integration has negative 
effects on national democracy, because fundamental political decisions can no longer be made 
at the place where debate and political conflict about them occur (Dahl 1999). Thus, Schmidt 
(2006) states that democracy requires ‘politics’ (debate, conflict and choice) to decide which 
‘policies’ (legislative output) to implement. The empowerment of the EU without the creation 
of democratic pan-European debate, however, has yielded ‘politics without policy’ at the 
national level and ‘policy without politics’ at the European level. That is, we debate and 
contest what should be done at the national level but national politicians are increasingly 
powerless to implement the results of these debates. At the same time, important policy 
decisions are made at the European level without the necessary debate. Hence, a dual or 
multilevel democratic deficit is created. Without a meaningful choice about policies at the 
national level, voters increasingly direct their frustration toward the polity (Mair 2007). By 
bringing polity contestation to the national level, politicisation reduces the democratic deficit 
of ‘policy without politics’ to ‘politics about polity’. 
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 The second perspective portrays international organisations as democracy enhancing. 
They help countries to overcome coordination problems caused by interdependence – a state 
of affairs that makes effective national policy-formulation increasingly impossible (Keohane 
2011; Keohane et al. 2009). The EU is thus regarded as a means to re-establish effective 
policy-formulation. Through this lens, the extent to which politicisation makes it more 
difficult to engage in collective policy-formulation within the EU reduces democratic 
legitimacy at the national level because important societal problems with an international 
dimension can no longer be effectively addressed. 
 De Wilde and Lord (2016) develop a differentiated view on the consequences of 
politicisation taking into account the conceptualisation and measurements of politicisation. 
They argue that the way polarisation pits one group against another – along international or 
domestic conflict lines – affects the democratic legitimacy of the EU in different ways. 
International polarisation, as we have seen in the Euro crisis debates, carries great potential 
for raising awareness and mobilising Europe’s citizens. Yet, it hinders democratic preference 
aggregation because deliberation across borders is limited and electoral competition non-
existent. Domestic polarisation may stimulate democratic legitimacy at the national level, but 
limits it at the European level, if it does not manifest in all member states equally. The 
contributions by Baglioni and Hurrelmann (2016) and Leupold (2016), moreover, highlight 
that the dominant focus on conflicting national demands results in an empowerment of 
national political institutions, particularly national governments. This could result in a more 
pronounced intergovernmental nature of the EU. 
Conclusion 
The contributions to this special issue provide an overview of politicisation research in the 
national context and novel insights into the causes and consequence of the differentiated 
politicisation of European governance. Going beyond the current literature, the contributions 
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disaggregate and examine politicisation processes among different sets of actors and on 
different objects. They highlight the explanatory power of intermediating factors, like the 
institutional surrounding and country-specific economic and cultural conditions in which 
politicisation unfolds. 
 Sharing a similar definition of politicisation, the authors draw on different data sources 
over a time span between 1970 and today and employ quantitative and qualitative methods 
leading to a differentiated picture of politicisation patterns across small and large countries, 
founding members and accession countries, and the non-member Switzerland. The volume 
includes contributions by Wonka on the interaction between parliament and mass media; 
Grande and Hutter, Hoeglinger, Leupold, and Schmidtke on polity and policy debates and its 
causes in mass media and party politics; Baglioni and Hurrelmann on public opinion; and De 
Wilde and Lord on the consequences of different patterns of politicisation for the democratic 
quality of European decision-making.  
 Taken together, the findings imply that the idea of ‘the politicisation of European 
governance’ in the singular is untenable to maintain. Rather, we face differentiated forms, 
degrees and manifestations of politicisation depending on the time, setting and location in 
which it unfolds. One result EU institutions or EU member states collectively have a hard 
time responding to the demands voiced in the process of politicisation. Different ‘Europes’ 
are demanded by different people, in different settings, different countries and even by the 
same people at different times. The special issue thus implies that future research should focus 
more strongly on some key intermediating variables, which shape politicisation on the 
ground. 
 One such variable is a country’s influence on EU politics. The more a nation perceives 
itself as capable of shaping and steering EU governance, the more likely it is to politicise 
other questions than just membership. A perception of choice and the sense of political 
efficacy is both an essential precondition for politicisation and subsequently strengthened by 
21 
it. A nation that perceives itself as powerless in EU governance, is unlikely to feature 
politicisation save for the ultimate question of membership. Politicisation of a left-right 
nature, in which a policy choice between individual freedom, collective equality or solidarity 
is presented, is therefore most likely in the big member states of core Europe, such as France 
and Germany. By contrast, small peripheral countries are less likely to feature the left-right 
contestation over EU policies. These countries rather feature conflicts over the EU polity and 
membership (Leupold 2016). The fact that countries like Switzerland have not participated as 
full members in EU governance, exactly because the authority of the EU is such a 
controversial and mobilising issue domestically, should be seen in this context. Politicisation 
is not necessarily the result of authority transfer, but may well be the reason why it did not 
happen (Schimmelfennig et al. 2015). The contributions to this volume strongly suggest a 
more nuanced testing of the authority transfer hypothesis using dynamic research designs in 
which both authority transfers in the past as well as plans for prospective transfers in the 
future can affect politicisation in the present. 
 Another key intermediating factor is the extent and nature of issue linkages with 
European affairs, in particular with immigration (Hoeglinger 2016). If those who contest 
migration are the same as those who contest European governance and they do so in similar 
ways, the politicisation of European governance is likely to ‘survive’ as long as migration is a 
contested issue in European societies. However, this linkage begs more research on the 
politicisation of European governance on migration. So far, little empirical knowledge exists 
on public debates, public opinion and party politics about Frontex, Fortress Europe, European 
labour mobility or Lampedusa and the European Blue Card. If the hypothesis about a growing 
globalisation cleavage is correct, few aspects of European governance should have the same 
mobilising potential as European migration policy. More generally, the effects of issue 
linkages and the emergence of a globalisation cleavage predict a long-term growth of 
politicisation. Building on the results of this volume, we expect this general trend to be 
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characterised by short-term issue attention cycles. Peaks and valleys are likely to be shaped by 
the political agenda of the time and place in question, and the relative salience of migration 
and European governance on that agenda. 
 While research in the 1990s and early 2000s has made a strong case that identity is a 
core factor shaping citizens’ views on European integration, the Euro crisis appears to re-link 
European integration to major macroeconomic factors and wealth distribution both within and 
between EU member states. Statham and Trenz (2013) have already hypothesised the returned 
primacy of economic interests in explaining the politicisation of European governance. Our 
analyses – particularly Leupold (2016) and Wonka (2016) – support this claim. Yet, even in 
clearly economic issue areas, like taxation, identity and cultural considerations continue to 
shape politicisation patterns (Schmidtke 2016). European issues are thus unlikely to become 
completely decoupled from ‘cultural’ issues, like migration. Hoeglinger’s (2016) findings 
illustrate this entanglement of economic and cultural issues. The extent to which issues of 
European integration are linked to economic and cultural concerns and the conditions that 
shape these linkages, such as the Euro crisis, are thus still open to future research. 
 Finally, more research is needed on the framing of EU governance during 
politicisation processes (for an early study see Diez Medrano 2003). Framing Europe in 
different ways does not directly imply ‘more’ or ‘less’ politicisation. Frames are therefore not 
part of the three core components of politicisation. However, processes of sense-making and 
framing are likely to impact the nature of politicisation. They may well facilitate or inhibit 
politicisation and carry implications for the consequences of politicisation. The contributions 
focusing on the Euro crisis show, for instance, that the intergovernmental framing of the EU 
during the crisis empowers national governments over opposition parties and European actors 
(Baglioni and Hurrelmann 2016; Leupold 2016; Wonka 2016). 
 We have argued that our focused conceptual and analytical approach to politicisation 
building on comparative research designs has the capacity to unveil differentiated patterns of 
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politicisation across time and space. However, in his concluding commentary Zürn (2016) 
points out that a broader understanding of politicisation processes may be inhibited as long as 
we do not open up the perspective in two important ways: First, more can be learned by 
comparing of the current politicisation of EU governance and the politicisation processes that 
shaped modern nation-states. Second, the analysis of the politicisation of a broader set of 
international organisations beyond the EU should yield more generalizable and robust results 
on the explanatory value of variables discussed in this volume (Zürn et al. 2012). Zürn also 
raises the question of whether our understanding of politicisation is too narrow. What we 
understand to be politicisation of European governance may provide the framework for a 
targeted and enriching line of research, but we ought to critically reflect on its embeddedness 
within broader social processes and institutional developments. 
  
24 
References 
Armingeon, Klaus, and Besir Ceka (2014). ‘The Loss of Trust in the Euorpean Union during 
the Great Recession since 2007: The Role of Heuristics from the National Political 
System’, European Union Politics, 15:1, 82–107. 
Auel, Katrin, and Thomas Christiansen (2015). ‘After Lisbon: National Parliaments in the 
European Union’, West European Politics, 38:2, 261–81. 
Baglioni, Sebastian, and Achim Hurrelmann (2016). ‘The Politicisation of European 
Integration in the Eurozone Crisis: Are Citizens Becoming More Engaged in EU 
Affairs?’, West European Politics, 39:1, 104-124. 
Bartolini, Stefano (2006). ‘Should the Union be ‘Politicised’? Prospects and Risks’, Notre 
Europe, Etudes & Recherches, /Policy paper N. 19, www.notre-
europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Policypaper19-en.pdf. 
Börzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse (2000). ‘When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and 
Domestic Change’, EUI Working Papers, 2000/56, European University Institute, 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/1696/1/00_56.pdf. 
Brinegar, Adam P., Seth K. Jolly, and Herbert Kitschelt (2004). ‘Varieties of Capitalism and 
Political Divides over European Integration’, in Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen 
(eds.), European Integration and Political Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 62–92. 
Castells, Manuel (2008). ‘The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication 
Networks, and Global Governance’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, 616:1, 78–93. 
Clark, Nick, and Robert Rohrschneider (2009). ‘Second-Order Elections versus First-Order 
Thinking: How Voters Perceive the Representation Process in a Multi-Layered System of 
Governance’, Journal of European Integration, 31:5, 645–64. 
25 
Closa, Carlos, and Alexandra Maatsch (2014). ‘In a Spirit of Solidarity? Justifying the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in National Parliamentary Debates’, Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 52:4, 826–42. 
Dahl, Robert A. (1999). ‘Can International Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View’, 
in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon (eds.), Democracy’s Edges, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 19–36. 
De Wilde, Pieter (2011). ‘No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing the 
Politicization of European Integration’, Journal of European Integration, 33:5, 559–75. 
De Wilde, Pieter (2014). ‘The Operating Logics of National Parliaments and Mass Media in 
the Politicisation of Europe’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 20:1, 46–61. 
De Wilde, Pieter, and Christopher Lord (2016). ‘Assessing Actually-Existing Trajectories of 
EU Politicisation’, West European Politics, 39:1, 145-163. 
De Wilde, Pieter, Asimina Michailidou, and Hans-Jörg Trenz (2014). ‘Converging on 
Euroscepticism: Online Polity Contestation During European Parliament Elections’, 
European Journal of Political Research, 53:4, 766–83. 
De Wilde, Pieter, and Michael Zürn (2012). ‘Can the Politicization of European Integration 
Be Reversed?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 50:S1, 137–53. 
Diez Medrano, Juan (2003). Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Easton, David (1965). A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Eriksen, Erik Oddvar (2009). The Unfinished Democratization of Europe, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Follesdal, Andreas, and Simon Hix (2006). ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A 
Response to Majone and Moravcsik’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44:3, 533–62. 
Genschel, Philipp, and Markus Jachtenfuchs, eds. (2014a). Beyond the Regulatory Polity? The 
Integration of Core State Powers, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
26 
Genschel, Philipp, and Markus Jachtenfuchs (2014b). ‘Vision vs. Process: An Institutionalist 
Account of the Euro Crisis’, in Council for European Studies, 21st International 
Conference of Europeanists. Washington. 
Grande, Edgar, and Swen Hutter (2016). ‘Beyond Authority Transfer: Explaining the 
Politicisation of Europe in Public Debates’, West European Politics, 39:1, 23-43. 
Green-Pedersen, Christoffer (2012). ‘A Giant Fast Asleep? Party Incentives and Politicisation 
of European Integration’, Political Studies, 60:1, 115–30. 
Haas, Ernst B. (2004[1958]). The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 
1950-1957, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 
Habermas, Jürgen (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of 
Law and Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Hix, Simon (2008). What’s Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It, Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Hobolt, Sara B. (2009). Europe in Question: Referendums on European Integration, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Hobolt, Sara B., and Jae-Jae Spoon (2012). ‘Motivating the European Voter: Parties, Issues, 
and Campaigns in European Parliament Elections’, European Journal of Political 
Reserach, 51:6, 701–27. 
Hobolt, Sara B., and James Tilley (2014). Blaming Europe: Responsibility without 
Accountability in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hoeglinger, Dominic (2016). ‘The Politicisation of European Integration in Domestic 
Election Campaigns: A Glass Half Full or Half Empty?’, West European Politics, 39:1, 
44-63. 
Hoffmann, Stanley (1964). ‘Conference on International Organization, Bellagio, June 12–16, 
1964: The European Process at Atlantic Crosspurposes’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 3:2, 85–101. 
27 
Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks (2009). ‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European 
Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus’, British Journal of 
Political Science, 39:1, 1–23. 
Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Carole J. Wilson (2004). ‘Does Left/Right Structure Party 
Positions on European Integration?’, in Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen (eds.), 
European Integration and Political Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
120–40. 
Hurrelmann, Achim, Anna Gora, and Andrea Wagner (2013). ‘The Politicization of European 
Integration: More than an Elite Affair?’, Political Studies, 63:1, 43–59. 
Hutter, Swen, and Edgar Grande (2014). ‘Politicizing Europe in the National Electoral Arena: 
A Comparative Analysis of Five West European Countries, 1970-2010’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 52:5, 1002–18. 
Keohane, Robert O. (2011). ‘Global Governance and Legitimacy’, Review of International 
Political Economy, 18:1, 99–109. 
Keohane, Robert O., Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik (2009). ‘Democracy-
Enhancing Multilateralism’, International Organization, 63:1, 1–31. 
Kleinen-von Königslöw, Katharina (2012). ‘Europe in Crisis? Testing the Stability and 
Explanatory Factors of the Europeanization of National Public Spheres’, International 
Communication Gazette, 74:5, 443–63. 
Kohler-Koch, Beate, and Berthold Rittberger, eds. (2007). Debating the Democratic 
Legitimacy of the European Union, Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Koopmans, Ruud, and Paul Statham, eds. (2010). The Making of a European Public Sphere: 
Media Discourse and Political Contention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Martin Dolezal, Marc Helbling, Dominic Hoeglinger, Swen 
Hutter, and Bruno Wueest (2012). Political Conflict in Western Europe, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
28 
Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and 
Timotheos Frey (2008). West European Politics in the Age of Globalization, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kritzinger, Sylvia (2003). ‘The Influence of the Nation-State on Individual Support for the 
European Union’, European Union Politics, 4:2, 219–42. 
Leuffen, Dirk, Berthold Rittberger, and Frank Schimmelfennig (2013). Differentiated 
Integration: Explaining Variation in the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan. 
Leupold, Anna (2016). ‘A Structural Approach to Politicisation in the Euro Crisis’, West 
European Politics, 39:1, 84-103. 
Lindberg, Leon N., and Stuart A. Scheingold (1970). Europe’s Would-Be Polity: Patterns of 
Change in the European Community, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc. 
Lord, Christopher (1998). Democracy in the European Union, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press. 
Lord, Christopher, and Johannes Pollak (2010). ‘The EU’s many Representative Modes: 
Colliding? Cohering?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 17:1, 117–36. 
Mair, Peter (2007). ‘Political Opposition and the European Union’, Government and 
Opposition, 42:1, 1–17. 
Majone, Giandomenico (1998). ‘Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards’, 
European Law Journal, 4:1, 5–28. 
Marks, Gary, and Marco R. Steenbergen, eds. (2004). European Integration and Political 
Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Marks, Gary, and Carole J. Wilson (2000). ‘The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of 
Party Response to European Integration’, British Journal of Political Science, 30:3, 433–
59. 
29 
Milward, Alan S. (2000). The European Rescue of the Nation-State, 2nd Edition. London: 
Routledge. 
Moravcsik, Andrew (1998). The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Moravcsik, Andrew (2006). ‘What Can We Learn from the Collapse of the European 
Constitutional Project?’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 47:2, 219–41. 
Munoz, Jordi, Mariano Torcal, and Eduard Bonet (2011). ‘Institutional Trust and Multilevel 
Government: Congruence or Compensation’, European Union Politics, 12:4, 551–74. 
Norris, Pippa, ed. (1999). Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nullmeier, Frank, Dominika Biegon, Jennifer Gronau, Sebastian Haunss, Falk Lenke, 
Henning Schmidtke, and Steffen Schneider (2014). Marktwirtschaft in der 
Legitimationskrise? Ein internationaler Vergleich, Frankfurt a.M.: Campus. 
Papadopoulos, Yannis, and Paul Magnette (2010). ‘On the Politicisation of the European 
Union: Lessons from Consociational National Politics’, West European Politics, 33:4, 
711–29. 
Pfetsch, Barbara, Silke Adam, and Barbara Eschner (2010). ‘The Media’s Voice over Europe: 
Issue Salience, Openness, and Conflict Lines in Editorials’, in Ruud Koopmans and Paul 
Statham (eds.), The Making of a European Public Sphere: Media Discourse and Political 
Contention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 151–70. 
Pianta, Mario (2013). ‘Democracy Lost: The Financial Crisis in Europe and the Role of Civil 
Society ‘, Journal of Civil Society, 9:2, 148–61. 
Rauh, Christian (2012). ‘Politicisation, Issue Salience, and Consumer Policies of the 
European Commission’, PhD Thesis. Free University Berlin. 
Rauh, Christian (2015). ‘Communicating Supranational Governance? The Salience of EU 
Affairs in the German Bundestag 1991-2013’, European Union Politics, 16:1, 116–38. 
30 
Rauh, Christian, and Michael Zürn (2014). ‘Zur Politisierung der EU in der Krise’, in Martin 
Heidenreich (ed.), Krise der europäischen Vergesellschaftung?, Wiesbaden: Springer, 
121–45. 
Risse, Thomas (2010). A Community of Europeans? Transnational Idenitities and Public 
Spheres, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Risse, Thomas, ed. (2015). European Public Spheres: Politics Is Back, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Rohrschneider, Robert, and Matthew Loveless (2010). ‘Macro Salience: How Economic and 
Political Contexts Mediate Popular Evaluations of the Democracy Deficit in the European 
Union’, Journal of Politics, 72:4, 1029–45. 
Schimmelfennig, Frank (2014). ‘European Integration in the Euro Crisis: The Limits of 
Postfunctionalism’, Journal of European Integration, 36:3, 321–37. 
Schimmelfennig, Frank, Dirk Leuffen, and Berthold Rittberger (2015). ‘The European Union 
as a System of Differentiated Integration: Interdependence, Politicization and 
Differentiation’, Journal of European Public Policy, 22:6, 764–82. 
Schmidt, Vivien A. (2006). Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Politics, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Schmidtke, Henning (2016). ‘The Differentiated Politicisation of European Tax Governance’, 
West European Politics, 39:1, 64-83. 
Schmitter, Philippe C. (1969). ‘Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about International 
Integration’, International Organization, 23:1, 161–66. 
Schrag Sternberg, Claudia (2013). The Struggle for EU Legitimacy: Public Contestation, 
1950-2005, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Sitter, Nick (2008). ‘The European Question and the Norwegian Party System since 1961: 
The Freezing of a Modern Cleavage or Contingent Opposition?’, in Aleks Szczerbiak and 
Paul Taggart (eds.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of 
31 
Euroscepticism. Volume 1: Case Studies and Country Surveys, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 328–47. 
Startin, Nick (2015). ‘Have we reached a Tipping Point? The Mainstreaming of 
Euroscepticism in the UK’, International Political Science Review, 36:3, 311–23. 
Statham, Paul, and Hans-Jörg Trenz (2013). The Politicization of Europe: Contesting the 
Constitution in the Mass Media, Abingdon: Routledge. 
Statham, Paul, and Hans-Jörg Trenz (2015). ‘Understanding the Mechanisms of EU 
Politicization: Lessons from the Eurozone Crisis’, Comparative European Politics, 13:3, 
287–306. 
Steenbergen, Marco R., Erica E. Ewards, and Catherine de Vries (2007). ‘Who’s Cueing 
Whom?: Mass-Elite Linkages and the Future of European Integration’, European Union 
Politics, 8:13, 13–35. 
Stoeckel, Florian (2013). ‘Ambivalent or Indifferent? Reconsidering the Structure of EU 
Public Opinion ‘, European Union Politics, 14:1, 23–45. 
Taggart, Paul (1998). ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western 
European Party Systems’, European Journal of Political Research, 33:3, 363–88. 
Van der Eijk, Cees, and Mark N. Franklin (2004). ‘Potential for Contestation on European 
Matters at National Elections in Europe’, in Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen 
(eds.), European Integration and Political Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 32–50. 
Van Ingelgom, Virginie (2014). Integrating Indifference: A Comparative, Qualitative and 
Quantitative Approach to the Legitimacy of European Integration, Colchester: ECPR 
Press. 
Wendler, Frank (2014). ‘Justification and Political Polarization in National Parliamentary 
Debates on EU Treaty Reform’, Journal of European Public Policy, 21:4, 549–67. 
32 
Wessler, Hartmut, Bernhard Peters, Michael Brüggemann, Katharina Kleinen-von Königslöw, 
and Stefanie Sifft (2008). Transnationalization of Public Spheres, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan. 
Wonka, Arndt (2016). ‘The Party Politics of the Euro Crisis in the German Bundestag: 
Frames, Positions and Salience’, West European Politics, 39:1, 125-144. 
Zürn, Michael (2016). ‘Opening up Europe: Next Steps in Politicisation Research’, West 
European Politics, 39:1, 164-182. 
Zürn, Michael, Martin Binder, and Matthias Ecker-Erhardt (2012). ‘International Authority 
and its Politicization’, International Theory, 4:1, 69–106. 
Zürn, Michael, and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, eds. (2013). Die Politisierung der Weltpolitik, 
Berlin: Suhrkamp. 
